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ABSTRACT 
 
Leadership, governance and performance in family businesses are broadly studied, but 
results are contradictory. There is a need for deeper understanding of these 
relationships since emotional and behavioral aspects are complex in these types 
businesses. Questions on the how and the why of board functioning and ownership, and 
their influences on performance are scarce, given lack of data or a focus on quantitative 
data. To find a balance between qualitative and quantitative methods, we explore fuzzy 
sets logic as a methodology to expand knowledge in family businesses and present an 
application to build a representation of entrepreneurial performance results based on 
board of directors’ composition and CEO’s ownership, using case studies. Results 
indicate that the methodology offers alternative explanations to governance, leadership 
and performance dimensions in these businesses. Using fuzzy sets logic, we find that 
entrepreneurial performance is higher when outsiders’ membership in boards of 
directors and CEO ownership are both high as well. 
 
Keywords: Leadership, governance, family business, fuzzy set logic, business 
performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Leadership and governance are topics broadly 
addressed and discussed in family businesses. 
Leadership deals mainly with succession and 
business continuity, governance deals with 
agency or stewardship theories, as antecedents 
of business performance. Strategic leadership 
focuses on what top executives do, how they 
do it and their effects on the organization 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009, p. 
4). The subject of strategic leadership research 
not only includes the executive leaders of 
organizations (i.e. the CEOs), but also other 
groups that have governance responsibilities 
and important influence. These include 
governing bodies like boards of directors. It is 
important to study strategic leaders because 
“the few people at the top of an enterprise have 
a major influence – through decisions and 
indecisions, boldness and timidity – on its 
form and fate” (Finkelstein, et al., 2009, p. 9). 
Moreover, if the unit of analysis is family 
businesses, it is necessary to include the 
family as a group that would influence 
decisions, as well.  
 
Leadership, governance and performance in 
family businesses have been broadly studied, 
but results have been contradictory. Therefore, 
there is a need for deeper understanding of this 
relationship in family businesses since 
emotional, behavioral and organizational 
aspects are complex in these types of 
businesses. In addition, research on board 
process and functioning research is scarce, 
mainly due to lack of data or a focus on 
quantitative data. Thus, a balance between 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies is 
needed (Gersick and Feliu, 2014). Therefore, 
the purpose of this article is to explore fuzzy 
sets logic as an alternative methodology to 
examine the effects of board of directors and 
ownership on family business entrepreneurial 
performance. 
Fuzzy-sets analysis is an analytic theory and 
method that extends on the concept of 
property space to bridge quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to measurement 
(Ragin, 2008, p. 82); it allows different 
configurations of cases conceived as 
combinations of qualitative attributes (Ragin, 
2000, p. 181); and accounts for contingency 
and complex antecedent conditions 
(Woodside, 2010). While some researchers 
view cases with extreme values as outliers in 
conventional statistical methods such as 
regression, fuzzy-set analysis views these 
extreme cases as important and highly 
representative of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Sereikhuoch & Woodside, 
2012, p.1).  
 
Given that fuzzy set theory is case-oriented 
research, it contributes to explore feelings, and 
behaviors involved in decision-making. 
Therefore, it is a useful tool for family 
business literature, in particular, that related to 
leadership, governance, and their relationship 
to firm performance.  The data we use in this 
article comes from the STEP Project (2016) 
for Family Enterprising, a global research 
project about entrepreneurial families’ 
transgenerational entrepreneurship. We have 
access to an important amount of cases around 
the world that explores in detail, leadership 
and governance decisions and the outcomes in 
terms of entrepreneurial performance.  
 
Specifically in this work, we ask the following 
research question: How can Fuzzy Sets 
Theory contribute to the understanding of 
family businesses’ governance decisions and 
their relationship with entrepreneurial 
performance? Although we only use four of 
the STEP cases for the purpose of this paper, 
we suggest for future research to increase our 
sample and expand knowledge in the 
corporate governance and leadership fields in 
family businesses. 
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In this article, we review the literature, 
followed by the methodology and the 
illustration of the application of fuzzy sets on 
governance decisions and its discussion. We 
offer conclusions and suggest different venues 
for future research to take advantage of this 
methodological approach’s potential in 
explaining family business managerial 
phenomena.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We begin the review with an introduction to 
fuzzy sets theory, followed by the literature on 
board of directors- performance relationship 
in family businesses and CEO’s ownership 
level and its relationship with entrepreneurial 
performance. 
 
Fuzzy Sets Theory 
The meaning of the “fuzzy” term is unclear, 
however, in fuzzy set theory this term presents 
a new usage that is not related to its original 
meaning (Grint 1997; Kosko, 1993). In this 
context, “fuzzy” is applied to a set, whose 
objects can have different degrees of 
membership in it (Zadeh, 1995). It means that 
the object of study presents an ambiguous 
status with respect to the class in the set. 
According to Zadeh (1995), this ambiguity in 
the classes plays an important role in human 
thinking, in topics such as pattern recognition, 
communication of information, and 
abstraction. 
The main advantage of fuzzy technique is that 
“researchers can analyze evidence in ways that 
directly reflect their theoretical arguments” 
(Ragin, 2000; p. 4), given that, fuzzy sets are 
based on theoretical and substantive 
knowledge. Unlike conventional quantitative 
approaches, whose focus is to explain 
variation in one or more dependent variables, 
not matter whether an independent variable is 
a subset of the outcome or a dependent 
variable. That is why Ragin (2000) states that 
conventional approaches have little use for 
set-theoretic relations. 
 
Moreover, fuzzy sets and conventional 
quantitative approaches present different 
starting points. In fuzzy sets the research is 
case-oriented, while in conventional 
approaches the research is variable-oriented. 
In a case study, the goal is to examine many 
case’s aspects in order to build a 
representation of each individual case from 
the interconnections among the aspects in 
each one of them. In other words, the variable-
oriented study analyzes a small number of 
variables across a very large number of cases 
in order to construct a generic representation, 
based on patterns observed across many cases, 
using correlation among variables (Ragin, 
2000, p.23).  
 
Therefore, the inverse relationship between 
the number of cases and the number of 
variables is evident. In this way, it is important 
to note that the case-study approach is a good 
research strategy for studying “how” 
something takes place, but it does not provide 
a basis of generalization and of causation, as 
the variable-study can do. However, the in-
depth study of a single case becomes relevant 
because this may be chosen given it is unique, 
extreme, or special in some way. The next step 
up, is then the investigation of multiple 
instances of the same outcome, from a single 
case study, in the way proposed by Mill (1843, 
1967) with his “method of agreement.” 
 
Fuzzy sets is a technique of analysis of case-
studies useful as tool of discovery. This 
technique injects new sophistication into the 
interrelation between theory and data, because 
it combines qualitative and quantitative 
assessment in a single instrument (Ragin, 
2000). Currently, fuzzy sets are used in many 
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different fields, such as social sciences (Ragin, 
2000), and business, finance and management 
(Bojadziev & Bojadziev, 2007). In particular, 
Jackson (2005) has studied an application of 
fuzzy sets in corporate governance. This 
author finds that employees have rights to 
representation within corporate boards in 
some countries explained by both union 
coordination and consensual political systems. 
The analysis covers 22 OECD countries, using 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data, and 
employs qualitative comparative analysis, and 
the application of fuzzy sets following Ragin 
(2000). 
 
Fuzzy logic models present five steps in its 
analysis: i) definition of linguistic variables, 
ii) definition of decision rules, iii) evaluation 
of decision rules, iv) development of 
aggregation process, and v) development of 
defuzzification process. As follows, we 
explain each one of these steps. 
 
i) Definition of linguistic process 
Fuzzy logic models use linguistic variables 
classified as inputs and outputs. Examples of 
linguistic variables in business contexts are 
risk investment, confidence, income and 
profitability, among others. These variables 
present different categories. The categories of 
linguistic variables are words. In the case of 
the linguistic variable risk investment, the 
categories can be low, medium low, medium, 
moderate, and high. Each linguistic variable 
presents a definition of universal sets called 
operating domain (Bojadziev & Bojadziev, 
2007). In addition, each category is defined by 
a membership function (𝜇𝐴(𝑥)). In this case, a 
membership function is a curve that defines 
how each point in the input space is mapped to 
a membership value (or degree of 
membership) between 0 and 1.  
It is assumed that the membership function 
(𝜇𝐴(𝑥)) is either piecewise continuous or 
discrete (Bojadziev & Bojadziev, 2007). 
Following the notation of Bojadziev & 
Bojadziev (2007) the membership rule that 
characterizes the elements (members) of a set 
𝐴 ⊂ 𝑈 can be established using the concept of 
membership function (𝜇𝐴(𝑥)) taking only two 
values, 1 and 0, indicating whether or not 𝑥 ∈
 𝑈 is a member of A: 
𝜇𝐴(𝑥) = {
1        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ∈  𝐴
0       𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥 ∉  𝐴
 
Hence 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) ∈ 0,1. 
 
The simplest membership functions are 
formed using straight lines. Of these, the most 
common are the triangular and the trapezoidal 
membership functions. Triangular function is 
a collection of three points forming a triangle. 
The trapezoidal membership function has a 
flat top. Figure 1 presents these membership 
functions. 
 
This membership helps to define the risk 
investment of a person. For example, one 
person with a risk investment of 45 is medium 
low in terms of risk to degree 0.25, and 
medium for the degree 0.75. The degrees are 
found by substituting 45 for x into the second 
equation of 𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑥) and the first 
equation of 𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝑥). 
 
ii) Decision rules  
Categories of input variables are related by 
means of decision rules, because the number 
of decision rules is calculated as the product of 
the number of categories of each input. The 
construction of these rules is where this 
approach demands researchers’ theoretical 
clarity.  
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Figure 1. Trapezoidal and triangular membership functions 
 
Figure 2 presents an example of the linguistic variable risk investment on the universal set 𝑈 =
 0,100 by triangular numbers that specify the terms low, medium low, medium, moderate, and 
high.  
 
 
Figure 2. Terms of the linguistic variable risk investment 
 
In this example, the terms’ membership functions are as follows: 
𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑥) = {
1        𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 5
30−𝑥
25
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 5 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 30
, 𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑥) = {
𝑥−5
25
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 5 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 30
50−𝑥
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 50
 
𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝑥) = {
𝑥−30
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 50
70−𝑥
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 50 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 70
,  𝜇𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑥) = {
𝑥−50
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 50 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 70
   
95−𝑥
25
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 70 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 95
 
𝜇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑥) = {
𝑥 − 70
25
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 70 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 95
   1      𝑓𝑜𝑟 95 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 100
 
 
 
iii) Rules evaluation  
low medium low moderate high
1
0 5 30 50 70 95 100
medium
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The rules are evaluated to define specific 
values for all inputs. These values are called 
readings, which can be obtained by 
measurement, observation or estimation. Each 
reading must be matched against the 
appropriate membership function representing 
the categories of each linguistic variable, 
producing induced decision table. 
 
iv) Aggregation process 
Aggregation process refers to finding the 
membership function image 𝜇𝐴(⋅) of fuzzy 
readings. These fuzzy terms are reduced to 
crisp values or singletons that are the actual 
intersection points between membership 
functions.  
 
v) Defuzzification process 
In the defuzzification process, often called 
fuzzy average, an estimation of the output is 
produced, which represents the membership 
function of an aggregated fuzzy term. There is 
no unique way to perform the operation of 
defuzzification. For the purpose of this paper, 
we apply two methods: centroid and bisector, 
using the Matlab toolbox. Centroid represents 
the center of area under the curve. Bisector is 
the vertical line that will divide the region into 
two sub-regions of equal area.  
 
Governance decisions and performance in 
family businesses 
We want to apply fuzzy sets logic to 
understand how the presence of outsiders in 
the board of family businesses and CEO’s 
level of ownership affect entrepreneurial 
performance. Governance systems pay the 
role of keeping the firm’s goals and actions in 
line with the expectations of the firm’s critical 
stakeholders via providing advice to and 
networking (service role), monitoring and 
aligning incentives of firm leadership (control 
role) (Hillman & Daziel, 2003). Given that 
firms are not similar in terms of who the 
critical stakeholders are, governance 
mechanisms, processes, motivations and 
results vary as much as firms. Family firms as 
well are rather heterogeneous; therefore, 
corporate governance issues in family firms 
differ widely (Goel, Jussila & Ikaheimonen, 
2014). Literature about family firm’s 
corporate governance has mainly two 
theoretical perspectives: agency theory and 
stewardship theory. Agency perspective views 
family business leadership as selfish and 
driven by expropriating benefits for the 
family, i.e. family owners are self-serving at 
the expense of minority shareholders (Morck, 
& Yeung, 2003).  Stewardship perspective 
views family business leadership driven by 
altruism towards all stakeholders and family 
in particular in pursuit of filial duty to provide 
for the next generation. Leaders under this 
perspective are characterized by self-
actualization to the benefit of all stakeholders 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). In the 
family business field, it is important to 
understand that if we choose a particular 
perspective, it could change results or 
relationships, particularly the governance 
structure-performance one. Contradictory 
results are present and contingencies are being 
studied related to the family structure, 
leadership and ownership, board of directors’ 
strategic participation, composition and 
processes. However, there is contradictory 
evidence on this point.  
 
There are several questions directly related to 
governance decisions in family businesses. 
The first question we consider is why a private 
family-owned business would elect to 
establish a board of directors, particularly with 
outsiders, if it is not mandated by law. One 
potential answer to this question would be that 
any business has some need for external 
advice and counsel to better deal with ongoing 
business challenges. Providing advice and 
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counsel and even new ideas is a very important 
role of regular corporate boards (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), even if it means 
some discomfort when executives have to 
justify their decisions to outsiders (Westphal, 
1999). In addition, many business owners seek 
for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 
145). Therefore, they choose to invite 
outsiders to participate in their boards of 
directors and that is why we choose this as the 
first input in our illustration.  
 
Having advice and counsel from outside 
directors can serve two purposes. First, it can 
improve the decisions made by executives, as 
McDonald and Westphal (2003) and others 
have shown. In this case, the advice and 
counsel extends to situations of significant 
family conflict or disagreement (Lester & 
Cannella, 2006). Here, outside directors are 
likely to be linked to other family businesses 
and to have extensive family business 
experience to draw upon. Second, when 
decisions are made, the presence and support 
of outside directors may placate remaining 
family members, especially those who are not 
involved in the business, as they are more 
confident of the value of the decisions and 
trust that their interests have been considered 
(Lester & Cannella, 2006).  
 
Family firm boards of directors have direct 
responsibilities in strategic choices like 
innovation, venturing or renewal and in 
monitoring and control, both of which could 
be reflected in performance (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003). These responsibilities will be 
easier to fulfill for outsiders than for insiders, 
especially if the insiders are not family 
members who are hesitant to challenge their 
boss or are concerned about keeping their jobs. 
As well, outsiders are more likely to ask 
questions not already considered by company 
managers or the CEO. These questions then 
could lead to better strategic choices for the 
company (Blumentritt, 2006). Hence, boards 
of directors that include outside members 
contribute expertise and objectivity, 
alternative perspectives, farsighted 
investment, on-the job learning and core skill 
development (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006) that may eventually explains 
performance, in particular, entrepreneurial 
performance, the output in our application. 
The definition of entrepreneurial performance 
that we use is the following:  “The sum of an 
organization's innovation, renewal, and 
venturing efforts where innovation involves 
creating and introducing products, production 
processes and organizational systems[…] 
Renewal means revitalizing the Company’s 
operations by changing the scope of its 
business, its competitive approaches, and 
acquiring new capabilities and then creatively 
leveraging them to add value to 
shareholders[…] Venturing means the 
[organization] will enter new businesses by 
expanding operations in existing or new 
markets”. (Zahra, 1995): 227 in Nordqvist, 
Marzano, Brenes, Jimenez and Fonseca, 2011, 
p. 14). 
 
Specifically, we expect that once a family 
opens its doors to outsiders in decision-
making positions, this opening will lead to 
improved entrepreneurial performance given 
that the effects that are usually expected from 
boards with different views, such us 
innovativeness, and creativity will arise and 
their resource dependence role will be more 
successful (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
At the end, the presence of outsiders in family 
businesses boards is expected to increase their 
entrepreneurial performance, but that depends 
on  the role of the CEO, which is affected by 
his/her ownership level. Accordingly, in our 
analysis with fuzzy sets, we expect outsiders’ 
presence on the board to have a medium to 
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high impact on family firms’ entrepreneurial 
performance, which tend to be higher as 
CEO’s level of ownership increases.  
 
CEO’s ownership level and family business 
entrepreneurial performance  
Our argument regarding the role of ownership 
dispersion as an input that affects 
entrepreneurial performance – the output –in 
our application of fuzzy sets theory has to do 
with the generation in charge of the business. 
As the generation in charge, the relationship 
between the composition of the board of 
directors and the role of the CEO and firm 
entrepreneurial performance changes, as well. 
We predict that when there is less ownership 
concentration (second and subsequent 
generations), the behavior of the family 
business is more like a non-family business 
and as this happens, entrepreneurial 
performance varies depending on the 
composition of both the board of directors and 
the CEO’s ownership.  
Studies focused on public companies have 
found that when founders are in charge as 
CEOs –which is usually in first generation 
businesses-or board chairs, firm financial 
performance is higher than when a non-family 
member is CEO or board chair- usually in 
subsequent generations (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). Moreover, these same authors found 
that when a second generation family member 
is the CEO, performance is the lowest. In this 
illustration, we argue that CEO’s level of 
ownership can affect entrepreneurial 
performance for two reasons. First, CEOs with 
high ownership stakes have little fear of losing 
their jobs by introducing new ideas or 
challenging the owners (virtually always a 
relative), and this provides at least the 
potential for them to contribute to strategy, 
innovation and change more effectively than 
would be the case in a non-family CEO (Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Second, we use 
the socioemotional wealth concept. Gómez-
Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, and 
Moyano-Fuentes (2007, p. 106) define it as 
“non-financial aspects of the firm that meet 
the family’s affective needs, such as identity, 
the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty”. These 
authors use the socioemotional wealth concept 
to explain how family businesses are less risk-
averse and more willing to accept performance 
hazards when socioemotional wealth loss is at 
stake. Because family members have 
significant socioemotional wealth invested in 
the company, they are highly committed to the 
companies and to the continuity of the 
companies (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007). 
Family business owners may choose to take 
significant risks and accept short run lower 
performance in order to retain control over 
their businesses. This motivates them to 
provide a long term vision for the firm, which 
can contribute positively to entrepreneurial 
performance. Moreover, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) found that family businesses are better 
performers and that when family members 
serve as CEO, financial performance is better 
than with non-family CEOs, suggesting that 
this is an effective organizational form. We 
think Fuzzy sets theory could help as expand 
this argument to entrepreneurial performance 
as well. However, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester, and Cannella (2007) found that family 
businesses do not outperform non-family 
businesses when lone founder firms are taken 
out of the family business group. Miller et al. 
(2007) concluded that some founders are not 
interested in involving other family members, 
and therefore are not particularly interested in 
passing the business along to heirs. Goel, 
Jussila, and Ikaheimonen (2014) point out the 
need to understand family businesses 
governance from an evolutionary focus, 
meaning that family business governance and 
the business itself evolve across generations 
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and one way to understand the changes and its 
results is to understand the reasons behind 
them. The point here is that it is important to 
differentiate the type of family business when 
performance is the output and the different 
governance configurations. 
 
In our case, we are interested in applying 
fuzzy sets to study the interrelation of 
outsiders in the board of directors and CEO 
ownership on family business (FB) in the firm 
entrepreneurial performance. As mentioned 
earlier, the application will be done using four 
case studies from the STEP Project for family 
Enterprising from Colombia, which are 
research cases about transgenerational 
entrepreneurship in family businesses. 
 
Lastly, Gersick and Feliu (2014) state that an 
integration of theories and understanding the 
antecedents of contingencies and outcomes 
such as ownership dispersion and continuity, 
stakeholders benefits and satisfaction, 
leadership development and entrepreneurship 
are necessary to interpret governance systems 
successes and failures. Therefore, structure 
and process of board, as well as the 
relationship between family control and 
organization performance in private family 
businesses. In Table 1, we summarize our 
expected results from the leadership and 
governance relationship with entrepreneurial 
performance, based on the underlying 
theoretical discussion presented above, after 
applying fuzzy sets logic. As is explained 
later, these expected outputs are the decision 
rules that we use on our model. We apply 
fuzzy sets theory as follows. 
 
Table 1 
Expected Output for Entrepreneurial Performance from Leadership and Governance Decisions 
Output : Entrepreneurial performance 
Input 1: CEO’s ownership (Leadership) 
Low Medium Low Medium High 
Input 2: 
Presence of outsiders in 
board 
(Governance) 
Low Low Low Medium Low Medium 
Medium Low Low Medium Low Medium High 
Medium Medium Low Medium Low Medium High 
High Medium Medium High High 
 
 
APPLICATION OF FUZZY SETS IN 
LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE 
DECISIONS IN FAMILY BUSINESS 
PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we use fuzzy sets theory to 
evaluate qualitative criteria in leadership and 
governance decisions in family business 
entrepreneurial performance. We want to 
explore if the inclusion of outsiders in boards 
of directors and CEO’s ownership in the firm 
explain firm entrepreneurial performance. 
 
 
We use four STEP cases in order to apply our 
fuzzy set approach. The companies in the 
cases belong to four different industries: food, 
financial services, cargo and logistics, and 
newspaper. All these companies are in second 
generation. The food and financial services’ 
companies present a high participation of 
outsiders in the board, while the companies of 
cargo and logistics and newspaper do not have 
board of directors. Regarding to CEO’s 
ownership, the newspaper company CEO 
possess 5%, while in the others companies the 
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CEOs have values of ownership lower than 
33%. Finally, concerning to entrepreneurial 
activities, the food company have developed 
activities such as new ventures, consulting and 
advisory initiatives for family members, and 
changes in family protocol and governance 
structures. In addition, the financial services 
company has been dedicated to activities 
related to technological change, new products 
and services, strategic alliances, and family 
protocol and governance structures. The 
activities that represent the entrepreneurial 
performance of Cargo and Logistics Company 
are focused on brand structure and 
entrepreneurial first and second generations, 
while the newspaper company developed 
activities related to: diversification of 
products, technological change, new ventures, 
and family protocol and governance 
structures. 
 
The objective of our model is to estimate an 
entrepreneurial performance level as output, 
for any given values of inputs variables 
(presence of outsiders in boards and CEO’s 
ownership). 
 
For this model, we follow five steps: i) 
definition of linguistic variables, ii) definition 
of decision rules, iii) Rule evaluation, iv) 
development of aggregation process, and v) 
development of defuzzification process. 
 
i) Linguistic variables definition 
In this leadership and governance model for 
family firms we have defined two inputs and 
one output. The inputs are inclusion of 
outsiders in boards of directors and CEO’s 
ownership level. The output variable is 
entrepreneurial performance level. Each one 
of the linguistic variables included has four 
categories. Following Bojadziev and 
Bojadziev (2007) we denote these linguistic 
variables and its categories as: 
 
 
Presence of outsiders in board ≜  A = {A1,  A2, A3, A4} = {L,ML,M, H} 
CEO′s ownership ≜  B = {B1,  B2, B3, B4} = {L,ML,M, H} 
Entreprenerial performance ≜  C = {C1,  C2, C3, C4} = {L,ML,M, H} 
where L ≜ Low, 𝑀L ≜ Medium Low, M ≜ Medium, and H ≜ High. 
 
The Ai, Bj, and Ck are fuzzy sets defined as: 
Ai = {(x, μAi(x)) |x ∈ Ai∁ U1} , i = 1,2,3,4. 
Bj = {(y, μBj(y)) |y ∈ Bj∁ U2} , j = 1,2,3,4. 
Ck = {(z, μCk(z)) |z ∈ Ck∁ U3} , k = 1,2,3,4, 
 
where U1 = {x|0 ≤ x ≤ 100}, U2 = {y|0 ≤ y ≤ 100} and U3 = {z|0 ≤ z ≤ 100}, and the real 
numbers x, y and z represent values on a scale from 0 to 100 that measure the presence of 
outsiders in board, the CEOs ownership and the entrepreneurial performance. The terms of all 
linguistic variables presence of outsiders, CEOs ownership and entrepreneurial performance are 
described by a triangular membership function and have the same membership functions. Their 
analytical expressions are: 
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𝜇𝐿(𝜐) = {
1        𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 8
30−𝜐
22
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 8 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 30
,      𝜇𝑀𝐿(𝜐) = {
𝑣−8
22
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 8 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 30
50−𝜐
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 50
 
𝜇𝑀(𝜐) = {
𝑣−30
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 50
70−𝜐
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 50 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 70
,  𝜇𝐻(𝜐) = {
𝑣−50
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 50 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 70
   1      𝑓𝑜𝑟 70 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 100
. 
 
These expressions are presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Terms of the inputs and output 
 
ii) Decision rules 
As presented in Table 1 above, in our study the 
total number of rules is 16 derived of the 
product of the number of categories of inputs 
analyzed (CEO’s ownership and Presence of 
outsiders in board). These rules have a 
conclusion in terms of the output 
(entrepreneurial performance), which was 
derived based on underlying theoretical 
constructs. 
  
iii) Rules evaluation 
In each one of the four STEP cases, the rules 
are evaluated in order to define specific values 
for all inputs. For that, we estimate the 
readings for each case by observation, doing 
the exhaustive study of each case as follows. 
The food industry readings are 60 and 66, for 
CEO ownership and presence of outsiders in 
the board, respectively. In the case of financial 
services, the readings are 60 and 40, 
respectively. The Cargo and logistics case 
presents 10 and 50 as readings, and lastly, the 
newspaper case presents 10 and 10. 
 
Table 2 presents the induced decision table, 
which contains the readings for each case 
substituted in the corresponding membership 
functions for each case.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In general, our results show that the higher the 
CEO’s ownership stakes and the higher 
presence of outsiders in the board of directors, 
the higher output, i.e. family business 
entrepreneurial performance. These results 
concur with Miller and Le Breton-Miller 
(2006) and Blumentritt (2006), but for 
entrepreneurial performance. 
 
 
 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                            Vol. 27 ● No. 1 ● 2017       
 
62 
 
Table 2 
Induced Decision Table by Sector 
Case Food Industry Financial Services 
Input2   
 
Input 1 µH(66)= 4/5 µM(66)=1/5 µM(40)=1/2 µML(40)= 1/2 
µH(60)=1/2 µH(z) µH(z) µH(z) µH(z) 
µM(60)=1/2 µH(z) µM(z) µM(z) µM(z) 
Case Cargo and Logistics Newspaper 
Input2  
 
Input 1 µH(50)=0 µM(50)=1 µM(10)=10/11 µML(10)=1/11 
µL(10)=10/11 µM(z) µML(z) µL(z) µL(z) 
µML(10)=1/11 µM(z) µML(z) µL(z) µML(z) 
For each case only four cells contain nonzero terms. The result of this process will be used in next step. 
 
 
iv) Aggregation process 
The following analytic expression presents the membership function image μA(⋅) of fuzzy readings for each 
case (See table 3).  
 
 
Table 3 
Membership Function Image 𝜇𝐴(⋅) of Fuzzy Readings 
Food industry 
𝜇𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝜐) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑣 − 30
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 34
1
5
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 34 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 64
𝑣 − 50
20
  𝑓𝑜𝑟 64 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 71
  
1
2
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 71 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 100
 
Financial Services 
𝜇𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝜐) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑣 − 30
20
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 40
1
2
  𝑓𝑜𝑟 40 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 100
  
 
Cargo and Logistics 
𝜇𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝜐) =
{
  
 
  
 
𝑣 − 8
22
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 8 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 28
10
11
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 28 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 31,8
50 − 𝑣
20
     𝑓𝑜𝑟 31,8 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 50
  
 
Newspaper 
𝜇𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝜐) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
11
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 8
30 − 𝑣
22
  𝑓𝑜𝑟 8 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 28
  
1
11
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 28 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 48,2
50 − 𝑣
20
     𝑓𝑜𝑟 48,2 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 50
 
The graphic representation of these functions for each case is presented in Figure 4. It is important 
to note in the graphs below that the area under the curve of the darker lines is used to estimate the 
fuzzy average, which represents the output, in our case entrepreneurial performance.  
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Food industry 
 
Financial Services 
 
Cargo and Logistics 
 
Newspaper
 
Figure 4. Functions graphic representation by case 
 
v) Defuzzification process 
We apply centroid and bisector methods to estimate the output for each case. In Table 4 we present 
these estimations’ results using the two methods mentioned. It is observed that the estimations of 
entrepreneurial performance are very close for each case, regardless of the method used.  
 
 
Table 4 
Entrepreneurial Performance for each Case 
Case Centroid Method Bisector Method 
Food industry 72.3 74 
Financial Services 67.7 68 
Cargo and Logistics 29.3 29 
Newspaper 13.1 11 
30
1
8 50 v70
1/2
1/5
µ
MLL M H
30
1
8 50 v70
1/2
µ
MLL M H
30
1
8 50 v70
10/11
1/5
µ
MLL M H
30
1
8 50 v70
1/11
µ
MLL M H
10/11
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In addition, we find that socioemotional 
wealth arguments (Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007) 
serve to explain that CEO higher level of 
ownership can contribute to entrepreneurial 
performance, given that he/she will have a 
long run perspective on performance, in spite 
of having short-term expectations.  
Specifically, the food industry case present the 
highest level of entrepreneurial performance, 
which coincides with the predictions, 
presented in table 1, i.e. they have high level 
outsiders in the board and, the CEO has a high 
level of ownership. In contrast, the newspaper 
case presents a low level of entrepreneurial 
performance, a low participation of outsiders 
in the board and a low CEO’s ownership level. 
In comparison, the food industry case 
entrepreneurial performance is 6.7 times 
higher than the newspaper case.  As for the 
other two family businesses (cargo and 
logistics and financial services), they present a 
medium level of entrepreneurial performance. 
The cargo and logistics case has a low level of 
CEO’s ownership and a medium level of 
outsiders’ participation in the board. In the 
financial services case, has a high level of 
CEO’s ownership and a medium level of 
outsiders’ participation in the board.  
 
The main difference between this 
methodology and conventional methods is that 
fuzzy sets theory allows an estimation of a 
value for an output, which is a qualitative 
variable, difficult to measure.  Fuzzy sets, 
permits researchers to explore deeper and 
directly on constructs otherwise measured by 
proxies. Given that we have found satisfactory 
and rational results with this approach, we 
expect to generalize by adding more cases. As 
a result, we offer an explanation of predict a 
considerable impact on how family business 
as a research field could apply this 
methodology to help family businesses 
generate value across generations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For future venues, we think that the potential 
of this methodology is endless in family 
business research and practices. Case studies 
offer in-depth understanding on how and why 
questions behind other potential inputs in 
family businesses such as, generations in 
charge, historical perspectives, culture, 
socioemotional wealth, that could change the 
level of the output chosen. Moreover, different 
key performance indicators of these types of 
businesses like business continuity and/or 
longevity, social and financial performance, 
succession success, among others, can be 
explained using fuzzy sets theory. As Ragin 
(2000) states, we hope this work opens more 
possibilities of research by offering a new tool 
in the family business field.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding-
family ownership and firm 
performance: evidence from the S&P 
500. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-
1328. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00567 
Bojadziev, G. & Bojadziev, M. (1995). Fuzzy 
Sets, Fuzzy Logic, Applications, 
Singapore, World Scientific. 
Blumentritt, T. (2006). The relationship 
between boards and planning in family 
businesses. Family Business Review, 
19(1), 65-72.  
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A., 
Jr. (2003). Corporate governance: 
Decade of dialogue and data. Academy 
of Management Review, 28(3), 371-
382.  
Eng, S. and Woodside, A. (2012). Configural 
analysis of the drinking man: Fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysiss, 
Addictive Behaviors, 37(4), 541–543. 
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, 
A. A., Jr. (2009). Strategic leadership: 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                            Vol. 27 ● No. 1 ● 2017       
 
65 
 
theory and research on executives, top 
management teams, and boards. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Gersick, K. E. & Feliu, N. (2014). Governing 
the family enterprise. In Melin, L., 
Nordqvist, M. & Sharma, P. (Eds.) The 
SAGE Handbook of Family Business 
(196-225). London: Sage Publications 
LTD.    
Goel, S., Jussila, L., & Ikäheimonen, T. 
(2014). Governance in family firms, In 
Melin, L., Nordqvist, M. & Sharma, P. 
(Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Family 
Business. London: Sage Publications 
LTD. 
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-
Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & 
Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). 
Socioemotional wealth and business 
risks in family-controlled firms: 
Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 
52(1), 106-137.  
Grint, K. (1997). Fuzzy Management: 
Contemporary ideas and practices at 
work. New York: Oxford. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of 
directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource 
dependence perspectives. Academy of 
Management Review, 28(3), 383-396.  
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., Jr., & 
Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource 
dependence role of corporate directors: 
Strategic adaptation of board 
composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of 
Management Studies, 37(2), 235-255.  
Jackson, G. (2005). Employee Representation 
in the board compared: A fuzzy sets 
analysis of corporate governance, 
unionism, and political institutions. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 12(3), 1-28. 
Kosko, B. (1993). Fuzzy thinking. New York: 
Hyperion. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2009). 
Agency vs. stewardship in public 
family firms: A social embeddedness 
reconciliation. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, 33(6), 1169-1191. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00339. 
Lester, R. H., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2006). 
Interorganizational familiness: How 
family firms use interlocking 
directorates to build community-level 
social capital. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, 30(6), 755-775. 
McDonald, M. L., & Westphal, J. D. 
(2003). Getting by with the advice of 
their friends: CEOs' advice networks 
and firms' strategic responses to poor 
performance. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 48(1), 1-32.  
Mill, J.S. [1843] (1967). A system of logic: 
Ratiocinative and inductive. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). 
Family governance and firm 
performance: Agency, stewardship, 
and capabilities. Family Business 
Review, 19(1), 73-87. doi: 
10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00063.x 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., 
& Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2007). Are 
family firms really superior 
performers? Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 13(5), 829-858. doi: 
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.03.004. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency 
problems in large family business 
groups. Entrepreneurship: Theory & 
Practice, 27(4), 367-382. doi: 
10.1111/1540-8520.t01-1-00015 
Nordqvist, M, Marzano, G., Brenes, E., 
Jimenez, G., & Fonseca, M. (2011). 
Understanding entrepreneurial family 
businesses in uncertain environments: 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                            Vol. 27 ● No. 1 ● 2017       
 
66 
 
opportunities and resources in Latin 
America. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar.  
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The 
external control of organizations: a 
resource dependence structure. New 
York: Harper & Row. Publications 
LTD. 
Ragin, C.C. (2000). Fuzzy-set social science. 
Chicago, USA: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Ragin, C. C. (2008). Redesigning social 
inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
STEP Project. (2016). Retrieved from 
http://www.babson.edu/Academics/cent
ers/blank-center/global-
research/step/pages/home.aspx 
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do 
family ownership, control and 
management affect firm value? Journal 
of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-
417. 
Westphal, J. D. (1999). Collaboration in the 
boardroom: Behavioral and 
performance consequences of CEO-
board social ties. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42(1), 7-24.  
Woodside, A. G. (2011). Fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis in industrial 
buying-marketing negotiations over 
share of business. Society for 
Marketing Advances Proceedings, 
25(1), 161-162.  
Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy Sets, Information 
and Control, 8, 338-353. 
Zahra, S.A. (1995). Corporate entrepreneur-
ship and financial performance: The 
case of management leveraged 
buyouts. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 10(3), 225–247. 
 
